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EVIDENCE
I. RES GESTAE
In State v. Blackburn' the supreme court held that facts
stated, but not conclusions drawn, by a hearsay declarant are
admissible under the res gestae2 exception to the hearsay rule.
The court stated that a hearsay statement that "appears to be the
product of consideration and reflection . . .cannot qualify as
part of the res gestae.
' '3
The case arose from circumstances surrounding the death of
Pamela Tanner. Ms. Tanner was assaulted, set on fire in her car,
and later died as a result of her injuries. At trial, the state sought
to show that appellant's motive in allegedly procuring two men
to kill Ms. Tanner was to prevent her from testifying against him
on charges of arson, housebreaking and grand larceny. Appellant
1. 271 S.C. 324, 247 S.E.2d 334 (1978).
2. The term "res gestae" is one of many chameleonic legal terms the very use of which
is problematic because the term lacks precision. See, e.g., Comment, Res Gestae: A
Synonym for Confusion, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 229 (1968). Professor Morgan opened his 1922
survey of seven types of evidentiary issues regarding which the term res gestae is most
often used with a harsh attack on the abuse of the term:
The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reason-
ing, and the confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate
terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in the dealing with the admissi-
bility of evidence as 'res gestae.'It is probable that this troublesome expression
owes its existence and persistence in our law of evidence to an inclination of
judges and lawyers to avoid the toilsome exertion of exact analysis and precise
thinking. . . .It has been employed in almost every conceivable connection to
warrant the admission or exclusion of evidence. . . .When used to describe
utterances, it works unmitigated mischief.
Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J.
229, 229-30 (1922) (citations omitted). But McCormick is quick to point out that
"[h]istorically . . .the phrase served its purpose well. Its very vagueness made it easier
for courts to broaden it and thus provide for the admissibility of certain declarations in
new fields." C. MCCORMICK, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 288 at 687 (2d ed. 1972). Conclud-
ing, however, that "[tihe ancient phrase can well be jetisoned, with due acknowledgment
that it has served well its era in the evolution of evidence law," id., the commentator
favors the use "of more precise hearsay doctrine" terminology, id. at 686. The Federal
Rules of Evidence do in fact use more precise terminology. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)
(present sense impression), 802(2) (excited utterances), 803(3) (then existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition). Certainty being a virtuous goal of the law, South Caro-
lina courts and practitioners should consider narrowly phrasing their decisions, and objec-
tions and arguments regarding the res gestae exception. The characterization of the res
gestae exception by the court in Blackburn as being a combination of two federal excep-
tions, 271 S.C. at 329, 247 S.E.2d at 337, however, is not the most advisable or workable
approach. See notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text.
3. 271 S.C. at 328, 247 S.E.2d at 337.
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was convicted as an accessory before the fact of murder.'
In the course of the trial, the state introduced hearsay testi-
mony of an oral statement made by Ms. Tanner to an officer at
the hospital about an hour after the incident. A rescue squad
worker who heard the statement testified:
Q: What did you hear her say?
A: She told the deputy sheriff or the patrol, I do not remember
which one it was, that she felt sure that Gary Blackburn
[appellant] was behind all of this, that she was a star witness,
was supposed to be a witness in a case of his.5
This testimony was allowed into evidence by the trial court under
the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.' The supreme court
affirmed appellant's conviction and held that while the evidence
was improperly received, the admission constituted harmless
error in that the hearsay statement was cumulative to other in-
criminating evidence presented in the case.
In its opinion, the court characterized Ms. Tanner's state-
ment as hearsay7 and then focused on the content of the hearsay
4. Id. at 326, 247 S.E.2d at 336.
5. Record, vol. 1, at 28.
6. Such was the conclusion of the supreme court. 271 S.C. at 327, 247 S.E.2d at 336.
At trial, however, the circuit judge, even at the insistence of defense counsel, refused to
state the reasons for admissibility. The following exchange occurred:
Mr. Williams: We wanted the whole statement out, Your Honor, so we could
object to it.
The Court: Well, I overrule the objection. Bring in the jury please.
Mr. Williams: Before the jury comes in, on what grounds?
The Court: On what?
Mr. Williams: On what grounds do you overrule it?
The Court: I don't have to give you any grounds. Bring the jury in.
Record, vol. 1, at 30.
7. A popular definition of hearsay is Dean McCormick's: "Hearsay evidence is testi-
mony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being
offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for
its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." McCoRMICK, supra note 2, §
246 at 584. But McCormick recognized that the most any definition of hearsay "can
accomplish is to furnish a helpful starting point for discussion of the problems, and a
memory aid in recalling some of the solutions." Id. Curiously, there are relatively few
definitional statements of hearsay in South Carolina case law. After restating Dean
McCormick's definition, Professor Dreher noted that "[u]nfortunately, this threshhold
proposition has never been fully articulated by the South Carolina Supreme Court." J.
DREHER, A GUIDE To EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 59 (1967). One case that clearly
draws upon the classical definition is State v. Rivers, 186 S.C. 221, 196 S.E. 6 (1938). In
Rivers the court overruled a hearsay objection because the testimony in question did not
depend for its veracity upon the truth of the matter asserted, stating:
If this evidence had been offered for the purpose of showing the truth of the
2
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statement, holding that
[i]t is the very nature of Pamela Tanner's statement which
renders it inadmissible under the res gestae exception. The de-
clarant was stating her opinion as to why the assault occurred
rather than giving a factual account of how it-occurred ....
While the statement may have been sufficiently close in point
of time and place to form part of the res gestae, it failed to
explain, elucidate or in some way characterize the nature of the
event; rather it expressed a conclusion.'
The correct result, holding Ms. Tanner's statement inadmissible,
was reached by the court in Blackburn; the analytical approach,
however, is troubling. Under the court's approach the statement
was inadmissible because it failed to fall into the res gestae excep-
tion to the hearsay exclusionary rule. A conclusory statement
cannot properly be characterized as part of the res gestae; only a
factual statement can, the court held.' The more advisable ap-
proach, however, is to regard the statement itself as opinionated,
conclusory, offered by a declarant who lacks first-hand knowl-
edge, and thus, irrelevant.'0 The distinction between the court's
statement ... then it would have been objectionable, and should have been
excluded as hearsay testimony, but, as we view the words in the case at bar,
the issue was not as to the truth of the words spoken ... but whether such
words were actually uttered ....
Id. at 231-32, 196 S.E. at 11.
8. 271 S.C. at 328, 247 S.E.2d at 337 (emphasis in original).
9. Id.
10. While appellant's counsel briefly raised this point, the argument was not fully
explored. Of course, from a practical point of view, appellant's further exploration of the
issue was not necessary because appellant actually prevailed on the evidentiary matter
since the court did find error, albeit harmless. Rather than casting the evidentiary argu-
ment in the terms suggested in text, appellant's counsel discussed and developed the
requirements of the res gestae exception and then explained why the testimony at issue
failed to meet those requirements. Brief of Appellant at 2-4. Appellant argued that the
first basic requirement of the exception is that "the statement must be spontaneous with
the event," id. at 3, and then asserted that "[h]ere there is no question but that the
statement was made a substantial period of time after Pam Tanner was subjected to a
startling event," id. The second requirement of the res gestae exception, according to
appellant, is "that of place or proximity. Here the decedent had been removed from the
scene of the injury, having travelled for a substantial distance, and period of time, to the
hospital." Id. Appellant asserted that because of the attenuation of place of the accident
and place of the oral statement, this requirement also was not met. The third requirement
of the res gestae exception is "that '[tihe declaration must explain, elucidate or in some
way characterize' the startling event. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). In the context of the
third requirement, termed the "most important requirement of the res gestae rule," id.
at 3-4, appellant's counsel argued, id. at 4, and the supreme court held, 271 S.C. at 328,
247 S.E.2d at 337, that the oral statement at issue was an opinion or conclusion rather
3
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approach and the more advisable approach is more than aca-
demic. Under the court's analysis, if the hearsay declarant were
alive and in court she would be permitted to testify that the
defendant "was behind all of this"" since the real bar to the
statement's admissibility in the court's view was its hearsay char-
acter and the lack of an encompassing exception. Under the sug-
gested approach, however, even if the declarant were alive and
upon the witness stand, she would not be permitted to speculate
who orchestrated her assault since her speculation would be irrel-
evant as a conclusory opinion offered by a lay witness lacking
first-hand knowledge of the subject matter of her testimony.
Another difficulty with the evidentiary aspects of the court's
opinion in Blackburn lies in the court's attempt 2 to arrive at a
than the type of description properly admissible under the res gestae exception. Briefly
treating the approach suggested in text, appellant's counsel completed discussion of the
third requirement with the sentence: "Put another way, the statement was an irrelevant
opinion which neither tended to prove or disprove any fact in issue, and constituted
hearsay." Brief of Appellaht at 4.
Notwithstanding this passing mention of this argument in appellant's brief, the state
did address the point. The state, however, misapprehended the issue stating "[tihat
there is submittedly no question that the declarant would have been able to testify in the
form of opinion if she had lived and been a witness." Brief of Respondent, at 4. Authority
cited by the state for this proposition was State v. McClinton, 265 S.C. 171, 217 S.E.2d
584 (1975). McClinton, however, dealt with an entirely different issue: the rule that Dean
McCormick refered to as "[t]he so-called 'short-hand rendition' rule." McCoRmicK,
supra note 2, § 11 at 25. The short-hand rule, an exception to the general requirement
that a lay witness not be permitted to state an opinion, see generally id. at 22-26, allows
a witness to testify to his conclusion that "A was drunk" rather than testifying that he
"observed A exiting a bar staggering and belching." That precisely this type of issue was
before the court in McClinton is without doubt. In that case a law enforcement officer was
permitted to testify at trial that an injury on defendant's hand looked as if the hand had
been bitten. 265 S.C. at 174, 217 S.E.2d at 586. The court observed by way of a footnote
that Dean McCormick discussed "whether these remarks really are conclusions." Id. at
177, n.2, 217 S.E.2d at 586 n.2. McClinton clearly should not be relied upon as authority
for the proposition that had Ms. Tanner lived and testified she would have been permitted
to speculate on the witness stand regarding the motives behind her assault.
This analysis suggests that the approach discussed textually, that is, viewing Ms.
Tanner's oral statement as inadmissible as a conclusory and irrelevant opinion of a lay
witness without regard to the statement's hearsay nature, was not fully developed in
briefs. The court's adoption of the appellant's approach, viewing the issue in terms of res
gestae alone, is thus quite understandable.
11. Record, vol. 1, at 28.
12. See note 2 supra. For an often-cited definition of res gestae see Marshall v,
Thomason, 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962). Marshall was heralded by Professor Dreher:
Our Supreme Court has now done all that it should need to do to put an
end to this [confusion] by carefully defining in Marshall . . . what res gestae
really means. The Court there said that statements will not be admissible under
the res gestae doctrine unless they were "the spontaneous utterances of the mind
4
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definition of res gestae. After stating its holding on the eviden-
tiary issue,' 3 the court speculated that Ms. Tanner's statement
would be admissible as an excited utterance in federal practice
under Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 "Under
state practice, however, the statement must be both an excited
utterance and a present sense impression to be admitted as part
of the res gestae.' 5 The court's initial speculation that the state-
ment at issue would qualify as an excited utterance under the
Federal Rules of Evidence is far from certain. While ihe Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 803 does indicate that an excited utter-
ance "need only 'relate' to the startling event or condition,'"" the
exception probably would not be construed to admit into evi-
dence Ms. Tanner's accusatory and conclusory statement, espe-
cially in light of the clear dictate of Rule 701,1 which prevents a
lay witness from offering an opinion except in narrowly defined
circumstances, 8 and that of Rule 602, which requires that a non-
expert witness have personal knowledge of the subject matter of
his testimony. 9 The proposition is thus unlikely that Ms. Tan-
ner's statement would be admissible as hearsay in federal prac-
tice under the excited utterance exception when the very subject
while under the active, immediate influences of the transaction; the circumstan-
ces precluding the idea that the utterances were the result of reflection or de-
signed to make false or self-serving declarations." A better definition could
hardly be stated.
J. DREHER, supra note 7, at 78 (citations omitted). Marshall, however, was no panacea for
the terminological ills of res gestae. See generally note 2 supra.
13. "It is the very nature of Pamela Tanner's statement which renders it inadmissible
under the res gestae exception." 271 S.C. at 328, 247 S.E.2d at 337.
14. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
15. 271 S.C. at 329, 247 S.E.2d at 337.
16. FED. R. Evw. 803, Advisory Comm. Note.
17. FED. R. EvD. 701.
18. Rule 701 states:
If a witness is not testifying as an bxpert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
FED. R. EviD. 701. This rule clearly requires a witness to have firsthand knowledge of the
subject matter of his testimony, but allows a witness possessing such knowledge to draw
short-hand conclusions of the type discussed in note 10 supra. FED. R. EviD. 701, Advisory
Comm. Note.
19. FED. R. Evm. 602. Of course, Rule 602 "does not govern the situation of a witness
who testifies to a hearsay statement as such, if he has personal knowledge of the making
of the statement," FED. R. Evm. 602, Advisory Comm. Note. However, the witness in
Blackburn testified to a statement about which even the declarant, Ms. Tanner, ostensi-
bly lacked firsthand knowledge.
5
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matter of the statement would militate against admissiblity even
if the declarant sought to draw the identical conclusion as a wit-
ness in federal court.
In the context of speculating on the Federal Rules, the court
in Blackburn offered a new definition of res gestae. To qualify
under the res gestae exception, a statement by a hearsay declar-
ant "must be both an excited utterance and a present sense im-
pression ..... ,0 This new definition of res gestae would nar-
rowly limit the exception's availability with regard to statements
made at the time of or immediately after the occurrence of the
exciting event. Such is the case because only a very slight lapse
of time between event and hearsay declaration is permitted under
the Federal Rules present sense impression exception." While the
court's definition would inject some predictability into the
res gestae exception, it blurs the distinct rationale behind
separate federal exceptions: a present sense impression is re-
garded as trustworthy because the "substantial contemporaneity
of event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or
conscious misrepresentation";2" an excited utterance is regarded
as trustworthy because circumstances surrounding the statement
"may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills
the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of con-
scious fabrication."2 These arguably24 legitimate rationales sug-
20. 271 S.C. at 329, 247 S.E.2d at 337.
21. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803 is rather explicit in this regard:
"With respect to the time element, Exception (1) [present sense impression] recognizes
that in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not possible, and hence,
a slight lapse is allowable." FED. R. Evm. 803, Advisory Comm. Note. (emphasis in
original).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The rationale for the excited utterance exception is the subject of weighty criti-
cism from commentators who have considered it. The theory that physical shock to a
victim induces truthfulness has been said to be
faulty on every score. Excitement is not a guarantee against lying ....
[E]xcitement exaggerates, sometimes grossly, distortion in perception and
memory especially when the observer is a witness to a nonroutine, episodic event
such as occurs in automobile collision cases and crimes. The likelihood of inac-
curate perception, the drawing of inferences to fill memory gaps, and the report-
ing of nonfacts is.high.
Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. Rav. 1, 28 (citations omitted). The Stewart
article is an excellent source to a practitioner seeking to challenge the logic and rationale
behind the common-law hearsay exception for excited utterances, spontaneous declara-
tion, or the South Carolina hybrid res gestae as announced in Blackburn. Other authori-
[Vol. 31
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gest that an approach more advisable than that taken by the
court in Blackburn would discard the term res gestae,2 yet recog-
nize, as do the Federal Rules, the existence of two distinct excep-
tions in its stead.
11. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Underlying Facts Requirement
In Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.,26 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that even an expert who has personally examined the
subject matter of his testimony must testify to the facts underly-
ing his analysis. Tide Craft is the most unequivocal statement of
this requirement in South Carolina case law.27
Respondent Young was awarded $200,000 in damages" for
survival and wrongful death actions against appellant Tide Craft,
Inc., the manufacturer of the boat in which respondent's husband
was killed. At the jury trial, respondent advanced alternative
theories of recovery in negligence, breach of implied warranty and
strict tort liability.
29
A critical element of respondent's case was the causal
connection between alleged steering system design defects in de-
cedent's boat and decedent's fatal injuries. Respondent at-
tempted to establish causation at trial through the testimony of
ties note and explore this problem. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 297 at 704. "The
entire basis for the exception is, of course, subject to question." Id. See also Hutchins
and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432, 437
(1928). "One need not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made under emotional
stress; everybody accepts such statements with mental reservation." Id.
25. See generally note 2 supra.
26. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
27. Two prior South Carolina cases, Benford v. Berkeley Heating Co., 258 S.C. 357,
188 S.E.2d 841 (1972), and Chapman v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 249 S.C. 438, 154 S.E.2d
845 (1967), were cited in Tide Craft as supporting the requirement that the expert disclose
facts underlying his analysis on direct examination; however, the cases only tend to point
toward such a holding. But see Bailey v. McDougall, 251 S.C. 290, 162 S.E.2d 177 (1968);
State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1930). On the basis of Bailey, Justice Ness
argued in his dissent in Tide Craft that "an expert's opinion must either be based on facts
within his knowledge or upon facts obtained from evidence presented or to be presented
at trial which are tendered in the form of a hypothetical question." 270 S.C. at 474, 242
S.E.2d at 681 (Ness, J., dissenting). See generally Note, The New Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and South Carolina Evidentiary Law: A Comparison and Critical Analysis, 28
S.C.L. REv. 481, 534-35 (1977).
28. The award consisted of $30,000 actual damages for conscious pain and suffering,
$160,000 actual damages for wrongful death, and $10,000 punitive damages for wrongful
death. 270 S.C. at 461, 242 S.E.2d at 675.
29. Id.
1979]
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an expert witness who was qualified, over objection,3 " as a
"human factors" engineer.31 The expert testified that he person-
ally had inspected the boat in question and had made measure-
ments from which he calculated the "motion and lateral forces on
the person if the boat did lose the steerifig. ' '32 In part through his
calculations, the expert was able to conclude at trial that each
defect was a contributing cause "of Young's ejection and that, if
any one .. had been removed, Young would not have met his
death."
33
The supreme court reversed, holding inter alia that the ex-
pert did not testify to the facts underlying his conclusion of causa-
tion and therefore "his conclusion was simply a surmise, lacking
in probative value and inadequate to establish the alleged causal
connection."3 The supreme court did, however, indicate a minor
30. Record at 226-27.
31. The witness explained the "human factors" field:
This is a discipline that's been around. . . for 40 or 50 years. . . . You have a
base of psychology and engineering combined in your undergraduate and gradu-
ate curriculum. The objective is to analyze products, whatever the product may
be, from the standpoint of how the human being fits that product. How does he
operate,. . . what are the dangers concerned with it, how does the human being
use his five senses, his basic strengths, his size ....
Id. at 212-13.
32. Record at 230.
33. 270 S.C. at 467, 242 S.E.2d at 678. The majority opinion noted that respondent's
expert relied on a "domino theory" of causation. The theory regarded "loss of steering and
each of the defects which allegedly resulted in the propensity to eject" as a single domino.
Id. The theory and supporting evidence, however, were insufficient to establish cause
"with any reasonable degree of accuracy":
[D]espite [expert] Fowler's testimony that he could have mathematically
rated each of the "dominoes" as to its potential for danger, he made no attempt
to ascertain the nature and extent of the operative, dynamic forces, nor did he
attempt to scientifically determine the contribution, if any, of the individual
"dominoes" to ejection. Not having done so, it was impossible to say with any
reasonable degree of accuracy that the dynamic forces attributable to the al-
leged defects contributed to Young's ejection to the extent that ejection would
not have occurred in the absence of the alleged defects.
Id. at 470, 242 S.E.2d at 679. For a focused discussion of the nonevidentiary issues in Tide
Craft, see Products Liability, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. Rsv. 101,
109 passim (1979).
34. 270 S.C. at 468, 242 S.E.2d at 678. In his dissent, Justice Ness argued, in effect,
that because the expert had personally examined the boat the expert testimony should
not be held to have been improperly admitted for failure to state underlying facts:
Here, respondent's expert testified at length and and in detail regarding his
examination and testing of the boat in question. His findings with respect to the
absence of seat locks and deadman switches, the positioning of the seat and the
horsepower of the boat were unchallenged. Thus, the factual basis for his conclu-
sions was predicated on his examination of the boat and the manufacturer's
specifications. His conclusion that the absence of these features contributed to
8
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qualification to the underlying facts requirement, stating that it
"is by no means intended to be a requirement that the expert set
out his calculations or detail the scientific or professional knowl-
edge leading to his conclusions."35 The court clearly expressed
concern with an expert rendering an opinion based on irrelevant,
nonmaterial facts and warned that the minor qualification was
not a license to disregard the requirement:
Neither should it be implied, however, that the complexity of
the expert's area of knowledge relieves him of establishing, be-
fore the jury, the underlying basis for his opinion. However com-
plex or esoteric the specialized knowledge the expert draws
upon, he must show that in formulating his opinion, he has
taken into consideration the material facts of the case being
tried which was [sic] necessary to the formation of an intelli-
gent opinion. 6
The court's requirement that an expert who has personally
examined the subject matter of his testimony state the underly-
ing basis of his opinion would clearly discourage an expert's reli-
ance upon assumed or debatable facts. Such reliance would in-
vade the jury's province as the trier of fact 37 because the expert
would, without disclosure, resolve factual disputes in the formu-
lation of his opinion. The Tide Craft requirement insures that the
jury knows which facts are assumed or debatable prior to the
expert's opinion testimony. Once the underlying facts are dis-
closed, jurors are free to question the facts and to assign due
weight to them.
The supreme court in Tide Craft rejected the more modern
approach embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which pro-
vide that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of opinion or infer-
ence and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross-examination. '3 The essential distinction
between the Tide Craft opinion and the federal rule is that the
the injuries cannot be attacked for failure to state the facts upon which they
were based, as they were premised on physical evidence.
Id. at 474, 242 S.E.2d at 681 (Ness, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 468, 242 S.E.2d at 678.
36. Id. at 469, 242 S.E.2d at 678.
37. See generally Comment, 21 N.Y.L.F. 669, 673 (1976).
38. FED. R. EVID. 705.
1979]
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former requires the proponent of the expert testimony to elicit the
underlying facts while the latter places this burden upon the
cross-examiner.39 The Federal Rule, however, can be used skill-
fully by the cross-examiner who chooses to elicit only those under-
lying facts that cause the jury to doubt the expert and chooses
not to elicit testimony regarding those underlying facts that are
beyond dispute."0 Tide Craft, on the other hand, stands for a more
complete factual disclosure on direct examination, prior to the
admission into evidence of expert testimony.
B. Hypothetical Question
The court in Tide Craft implied that a hypothetical question
would have been a viable way to admit the expert testimony."
Similarly, in Ballew v. Liberty Life Insurance Co.,42 the supreme
court approved the use of a hypothetical question to elicit expert
testimony.
In Ballew, appellant beneficiary brought an action to recover
on the double indemnity clause of his deceased son's life insur-
ance policy. On its face, the clause provided that the double
indemnity benefit "shall not be payable if the Insured's death
shall result directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, from . . . dis-
ease, illness or infirmity of the body or mind .... . Respon-
dent's theory at trial, buttressed by expert testimony, was that
the insured died from drug addiction and that addiction is a
disease falling within the policy's exclusionary clause. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the insurance company.
On appeal, appellant contended that the hypothetical ques-
tion forming the basis of testimony by respondent's drug addic-
tion expert should not have been admitted because the hypotheti-
cal differed significantly from the facts developed in the case."
39. See J. WALTZ, THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: AN ANALYsIs 112-13 (1975)..
40. For the cross-examiner to use this technique effectively, he must be aware of the
facts that the expert used in formulating his opinion. This necessity may present problems
when discovery is limited, but at least in federal practice, which permits broad use of
discovery devices, the technique can be used. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); FED. R. EviD.
705, Advisory Comm. Note; McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 16 at 37 n.12.
41. 270 S.C. at 467-68, 242 S.E.2d at 278. In situations in which the expert has first-
hand knowledge of the facts, however, generally "it is unnecessary to couch
questions eliciting the inferences in hypothetical form and it would certainly weaken the
effect of the testimony to do so." McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 14 at 31.
42. 270 S.C. 301, 241 S.E.2d 907 (1978).
43, Record at 126. See 270 S.C. at 303, 241 S.E.2d at 908.
44. 270 S.C. at 304, 241 S.E.2d at 909.
[Vol. 31
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Affirming the trial court, the supreme court approved of the hy-
pothetical. "Although some of the details assumed in the hypo-
thetical question propounded by respondent may not have been
specifically proven, the material facts assumed were within the
range of the evidence and there was no error in permitting the
expert to give his opinion in response to the question."45
In recent years, the hypothetical question has sustained
weighty criticism." The response of Congress and some state leg-
islatures has been to facilitate methods other than the hypotheti-
cal question to elicit expert testimony. The note accompanying
Federal Rule 70511 states:
The hypothetical question has been the target of a great deal of
criticism as encouraging partisan bias, affording an opportunity
for summing up in the middle of the case, and as complex and
time consuming .... While the rule allows counsel to make
disclosure of the underlying facts or data as a preliminary to the
giving of an expert opinion, if he chooses, the instances in which
he is required to do so are reduced. This is true whether the
expert bases his opinion on data furnished him at secondhand
or observed by him at firsthand.*
Thus, as Professor Waltz has observed, "Rule 705 does not do
away with the hypothetical question absolutely; it simply does
away with any absolute requirement that a hypothetical be used
by counsel."49 Evidentiary codes adopted in several jurisdictions,
notably California 50 and New York,' have taken the approach of
the federal rule. The New York statute, for example, provides
that "[u]nless the court orders otherwise, questions calling for
45. Id.
46. Dean McCormick criticized the hypothetical question observing that it
is an ingenious and logical device for enabling the jury to apply the expert's
scientific knowledge to the facts of the case. Nevertheless, it is a failure in
practice and an obstruction to the administration of justice. If we require that
it recite all the relevant facts, it becomes intolerably wordy. If we allow, as most
courts do, the interrogating counsel to select such of the material facts as he sees
fit, we tempt him to shape a one-sided hypothesis.
McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 16 at 36. See also 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 686 at 812 (1940
& Supp. 1979); Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 427 (1952); Note, The
Hypothetical Question in the Examination of Expert Witnesses, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 650,650-
51 (1975); Note, supra note 27, 28 S.C.L. REv. 481, 534-35 (1977).
47. FED. R. EvWD. 705, Advisory Comm. Note.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. J. WALTz, supra note 39, at 112-13 (citations omitted).
50. CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 1966).
51. N.Y. Cw. PRAc. LAw § 4515 (McKinney 1963).
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the opinion of an expert witness need not be hypothetical in form,
and the witness may state his opinion and reasons without first
specifying the data upon which it is based. Upon cross-
examination, he may be required to specify the data .... ",52
The South Carolina Supreme Court expressed no dissatisfac-
tion with the use of the hypothetical question in Ballew. Indeed,
the court's requirement in Tide Craft that underlying facts of an
expert's opinion be made known to the jury by the proponent of
the evidence suggests that the trial lawyer may frequently resort
to a hypothetical question in order to accumulate relevant under-
lying facts in an orderly and comprehensible presentation. When
used in federal court, the hypothetical question is virtually unas-
sailable as incomplete since Rule 705 does not require disclosure
of underlying facts. In state practice, however, the hypothetical
question must still contain a fair rendition of the facts of the case
and the material facts must be "within the range of the evi-
dence . . .,.5
III. BUSINESS RECORDS
In 1978, the state legislature passed the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act:
The term "business" shall include every kind of business, pro-
fession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether
carried on for profit or not.
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as rele-
vant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified
witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation,
and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near
the time of the act, condition or event and if, in the opinion of
the court, the sources of information, method and time of prepa-
ration were such as to justify its admission.
This section may be cited as the Uniform Business Records
as Evidence Act."
This legislation codifies the business records exception to the
hearsay exclusionary rule.55
52. Id.
53. 270 S.C. at 304, 241 S.E.2d at 909.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5-510 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 2 of the South Carolina
Act contains the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evi-
dence Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5-510(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
55. The uniform Act as adopted in South Carolina is substantially similar to the
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The traditional justification for the exception is the high
degree of reliability of regularly kept records, the value of which
to the record keeper depends upon their accuracy." The statute
clearly states that the custodian of the document or another
qualified witness may be called to identify it. This fact is signifi-
cant because the South Carolina common-law approach pre-
dating the 1978 statute is unclear on the issue of identification of
the business record sought to be admitted. In State v. Johnson,"7
for example, the court noted that the corporate records at issue
were identified by "several employees of the bank, and persons
who also kept the books of the trust company. '5 8 The court did
not explicate, however, whether the law required each person in
the document's chain of custody to testify. Indeed, the general
common-law, regularly kept records exception required that the
proponent either "call as witnesses all links in the organizational
chain by which the entry was made" or establish their unavaila-
bility.59 The South Carolina business records exception statute,
however, expressly rejects the chain of custody approach by not
insisting upon custodial identification of records to be admitted.
Two key limitations that the statute places upon the admis-
business records exception applicable in federal practice through Rule 803(6):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness: A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near
the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or cir-
cumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
FED. R. Evm. 803(6).
Prior to the enactment of section 19-5-510, the scope of the business records exception
to the hearsay rule in South Carolina was unclear. See, e.g., Watson v. Little, 229 S.C.
486, 93 S.E.2d 645 (1956); Currie v. Davis, 130 S.C. 408, 126 S.E. 119 (1923); United
Grocery Co. v. Donnelly & Son, 93 S.C. 168, 76 S.E. 195 (1912); Seaboard A.L. Ry. v.
Railroad Commrs., 86 S.C. 91, 67 S.E. 1069 (1910). But see Grand Strand Constr. Co. v.
Graves, 269 S.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 81 (1977), clarifying the common law. See generally
Evidence, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 30 S.C.L. Rav. 92, 96-100 (1979).
56. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 306 at 720. See generally Laughlin, Business Entries
and the Like, 46 IowA L. REy. 276 (1961).
57. 149 S.C. 195, 146 S.E. 657 (1929).
58. Id. at 210, 146 S.E. at 662.
59. McCORMIcK, supra note 2, § 312 at 729.
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sion into evidence of records lie in the requirements that the
record be made both in the regular course of business and with
sufficient contemporaneity with the occurrence of the act re-
corded. These requirements attempt to insure reliability and ac-
cordingly are critical attributes of the statute; however, the terms
are not defined in the statute. The statutory language granting
the trial court discretion in admitting the record may lead judges
to decide close "regular course" and contemporaneity issues on
the basis of whether "the sources of information, method and
time of preparation were such as to justify [the record's] admis-
sion."60
The enactment of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act is a positive step in the development of South Carolina evi-
dentiary law. The act eliminates much of the unpredictability
that surrounds a purely judicial exception to the hearsay rule and
replaces the essentially case-by-case, common-law approach to
the exception with a broadly worded statute that will facilitate
the admission of regularly kept records.
Joseph Barry Gellman
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5-510 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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